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Abstract
In discrete logarithm based cryptography, a method by Pohlig and Hellman allows solving the discrete
logarithm problem efficiently if the group order is known and has no large prime factors. The
consequence is that such groups are avoided. In the past, there have been proposals for cryptography
based on cyclic infrastructures. We will show that the Pohlig-Hellman method can be adapted to certain
cyclic infrastructures, which similarly implies that certain infrastructures should not be used for
cryptography. This generalizes a result by Müller, Vanstone and Zuccherato for infrastructures obtained
from hyperelliptic function fields.We recall the Pohlig-Hellman method, define the concept of a cyclic
infrastructure and briefly describe how to obtain such infrastructures from certain function fields of unit
rank~one. Then, we describe how to obtain cyclic groups from discrete cyclic infrastructures and how to
apply the Pohlig-Hellman method to compute absolute distances, which is in general a computationally
hard problem for cyclic infrastructures. Moreover, we give an algorithm which allows to test whether an
infrastructure satisfies certain requirements needed for applying the Pohlig-Hellman method, and
discuss whether the Pohlig-Hellman method is applicable in infrastructures obtained from number
fields. Finally, we discuss how this influences cryptography based on cyclic infrastructures.
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Abstract. In discrete logarithm based cryptography, a method by Pohlig and
Hellman allows solving the discrete logarithm problem efficiently if the group
order is known and has no large prime factors. The consequence is that such
groups are avoided. In the past, there have been proposals for cryptography
based on cyclic infrastructures. We will show that the Pohlig-Hellman method
can be adapted to certain cyclic infrastructures, which similarly implies that
certain infrastructures should not be used for cryptography. This generalizes
a result by Mu¨ller, Vanstone and Zuccherato for infrastructures obtained from
hyperelliptic function fields.
We recall the Pohlig-Hellman method, define the concept of a cyclic infras-
tructure and briefly describe how to obtain such infrastructures from certain
function fields of unit rank one. Then, we describe how to obtain cyclic groups
from discrete cyclic infrastructures and how to apply the Pohlig-Hellman meth-
od to compute absolute distances, which is in general a computationally hard
problem for cyclic infrastructures. Moreover, we give an algorithm which al-
lows to test whether an infrastructure satisfies certain requirements needed for
applying the Pohlig-Hellman method, and discuss whether the Pohlig-Hellman
method is applicable in infrastructures obtained from number fields. Finally,
we discuss how this influences cryptography based on cyclic infrastructures.
1. Introduction
Since the advent of cryptographic protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol and ElGamal encryption, the security of many cryptographic proto-
cols is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem: given h, an element
of a finite cyclic group 〈g〉, find an integer n ∈ N such that gn = h. In 1978,
S. C. Pohlig and M. E. Hellman [20] presented an algorithm which allows to quickly
solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite cyclic group if the group order |G|
has a known factorization into a product of relatively small primes (see Section 4
for more details). Since then, one prefers to use groups of (almost) prime order or
groups whose order has at least one large prime factor for discrete logarithm based
cryptography, to avoid this kind of attack.
In 1990, R. Scheidler, J. A. Buchmann and H. C. Williams described a key
exchange [5, 23], which was not based on cyclic groups but on a structure first
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introduced by D. Shanks in 1972 [28], called the infrastructure of a real quadratic
number field. This structure behaves similar to finite cyclic groups, with the main
difference that the operation corresponding to multiplication is not associative. This
structure was generalized from real quadratic number fields to arbitrary number
fields of unit rank one [6], and also to real quadratic function fields [33, 30, 32]
and more general function fields [25, 22]. Moreover, the key exchange protocol for
infrastructures was refined [13, 12] and extended to real quadratic function fields
[26, 10]. The security of these protocols is mostly based on the fact that computing
distances in infrastructures in general is assumed to be hard. As the problem of
computing distances in infrastructures is related (see Section 5) to the problem of
computing discrete logarithms in finite cyclic groups, one has to ask the question
whether the idea of Pohlig-Hellman can be applied in this setting.
In 1998, V. Mu¨ller, S. Vanstone and R. Zuccherato [18] answered this question
positively in the case of infrastructures obtained from real quadratic function fields
of characteristic 2. We will generalize this to obtain a positive answer for a more
general class of infrastructures, which includes all infrastructures obtained from
function fields. Then, we will argue why this is probably not possible for infrastruc-
tures obtained from number fields, at least without further input.
In Section 2, we will define the concept of a cyclic infrastructure and show how
such infrastructures can be obtained from certain global function fields with two
infinite places. After that, in Section 3, we will show how to obtain cyclic groups
from such infrastructures and how to efficiently compute in them, assuming that
one can efficiently compute in the underlying infrastructure. In Section 4, we will
recall how the Pohlig-Hellman method works, and in Section 5 we will show how
Pohlig-Hellman can be applied in the case of discrete cyclic infrastructures. Then,
in Section 6 we will describe an algorithm to test whether the main requirement
of the Pohlig-Hellman method, namely that the group order is smooth, is satisfied.
Finally, in Section 7, we will discuss the number field case, and in Section 8, we will
explain the consequences for cyclic infrastructure based cryptography.
2. Cyclic infrastructures
In this section, we define an abstract version of a cyclic infrastructure. This defi-
nition, including the description of baby steps and giant steps, is based on the inter-
pretation of Shanks’ infrastructure in context of a ‘circle group’ by H. W. Lenstra
[15], even though he uses a different distance function.
Roughly speaking, a cyclic infrastructure can be interpreted as a circle with a
finite set of points on it.
Definition 2.1. Let R ∈ R>0 be a positive real number. A cyclic infrastruc-
ture (X, d) of circumference R is a non-empty finite set X with an injective map d :
X → R/RZ, called the distance function.
Definition 2.2. We say that a cyclic infrastructure (X, d) of circumference R is
discrete if R ∈ Z and d(X) ⊆ Z/RZ.
One can interpret finite cyclic groups as discrete cyclic infrastructures as follows:
Let G = 〈g〉 be a finite cyclic group of order m and d : G→ Z/mZ be the discrete
logarithm map1 (to the base g), i.e. we have gd(h) = h for every h ∈ 〈g〉. By
1The discrete logarithm of an element h ∈ 〈g〉 is sometimes, in particular in Elementary Number
Theory, also called the index of h with respect to g.
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interpreting Z/mZ as a subset of R/mZ, we get that (G, d) is a discrete cyclic
infrastructure of circumference m.
An infrastructure has two operations, namely baby steps and giant steps. For
their definition, we need the following notation:
Definition 2.3. Let R ∈ R>0 and let x, y ∈ R/RZ. Write x = xˆ + RZ and
y = yˆ +RZ with xˆ, yˆ ∈ R such that xˆ ≤ yˆ < xˆ+R. Define
[x, y] := {t+RZ | t ∈ R, xˆ ≤ t ≤ yˆ}.
If one interprets R/RZ as a circle with circumference R, and x and y as points
on this circle, the set [x, y] can be interpreted as the points on the circle which lie
on the arc beginning at x and ending at y.
Now we can define baby steps and giant steps. We will exclude the case |X | = 1,
as in this case the infrastructure is trivial and not of practical interest.
Proposition 1. Let (X, d) be a cyclic infrastructure of circumference R. Assume
that |X | > 1.
(a) Then there is a unique bijective fixed point free map bs : X → X such that for
every x ∈ X, we have
[d(x), d(bs(x))] ∩ d(X) = {d(x), d(bs(x))}.
This map is called baby step map.
(b) Moreover, there is a unique map gs : X ×X → X such that for every x, y ∈ X,
we have
[d(x) + d(y), d(gs(x, y))] ∩ d(X) = {d(gs(x, y))}.
This map is called giant step map.
Let G = 〈g〉 be a finite cyclic group of order n > 1 and let d : G → Z/nZ
be the discrete logarithm map. Then, for the cyclic infrastructure (G, d), we have
bs(h) = gh and gs(h, h′) = hh′ for all h, h′ ∈ G. Applying d, this translates to
d(bs(h)) = d(h)+1 and d(gs(h, h′)) = d(h)+d(h′). This shows that baby and giant
steps in arbitrary infrastructures generalize the group operation of a finite cyclic
group.
In the case of finite cyclic groups, both baby steps and giant steps are basically
the same operation. In arbitrary infrastructures, this is not the case, as in general
there is no element x ∈ X with gs(x, y) = bs(y) for all y ∈ X .
In general, cyclic infrastructures behave similar to cyclic groups, with the main
difference being that the giant step operation is not necessarily associative, but
“almost” associative in the sense that
d(gs(x, y)) ≈ d(x) + d(y).
Here, “≈” for elements in R/RZ means that both sides have representatives in R
which are relatively close to each other.
We want to close this section by showing how to obtain discrete cyclic infrastruc-
tures from certain global function fields. Let Fq be a finite field with q elements and
K = Fq(x, y) a finite separable extension of Fq(x), x transcendental over Fq, such
that Fq is relatively algebraically closed in K. Let O be the integral closure of Fq[x]
in K, and assume that the degree valuation of Fq(x) has exactly two extensions to
K; these are the infinite places p1 and p2 of K. Let νi : K → Z ∪ {∞} be the
normalized valuation associated to pi, i = 1, 2.
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Now, by Dirichlet’s Unit Theorem for function fields [16, p. 299, Theorem 9.5],
O∗ = 〈ε〉⊕F∗q for some ε ∈ O∗ \F∗q ; without loss of generality, let R := −ν1(ε) > 0.
Assume that at least one of the infinite places has degree one.2
If a, b ∈ K∗ are two elements, then the principal fractional ideals Oa and Ob
are equal if, and only if, ab ∈ O∗. Therefore, if PId(O) denotes the set of non-zero
principal fractional ideals of O, we have a well-defined map
D : PId(O)→ Z/RZ, O 1
a
7→ −ν1(a) + RZ.
We say that a principal fractional ideal a ∈ PId(K) is reduced if 1 ∈ a and, for
every a ∈ a\{0} with νi(a) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, we must have a ∈ F∗q . Denote the set of all
reduced principal fractional ideals by Red(K). Now one has that d := D|Red(K) is
injective,3 which, in particular, shows that X := Red(K) is finite. Therefore, (X, d)
is a discrete cyclic infrastructure.
In certain cases, namely real quadratic (i.e. real hyperelliptic) function fields
[33, 32, 11] and for certain cubic function fields of unit rank one [25, 22], we can
efficiently compute baby steps, inverse baby steps and giant steps (i.e. given x, y ∈
X , we can compute bs(x), bs−1(x) and gs(x, y)), and we can efficiently compute
relative distances4
d(gs(a, b))− d(a)− d(b) and d(bs(a))− d(a)
for all a, b ∈ Red(K).
One further fundamental property of these infrastructures is that computation of
d is hard, i.e. given x ∈ X , it is hard to compute the absolute distance d(x) except
for a few special values of x. Moreover, R itself does not need to be known. This
allows to do cryptography in infrastructures, as for doing cryptography, one must be
able to efficiently compute certain objects (here: baby steps, giant steps and relative
distances), while inverse computations (here: computing absolute distances) must
be hard.
3. Obtaining cyclic groups from discrete cyclic infrastructures
Our aim is to embed a cyclic infrastructure into a one-dimensional torus and to
describe arithmetic on the torus using the arithmetic of the infrastructure, i.e. by
using giant and baby steps. More precisely, we embed the infrastructure into R/RZ
or Z/RZ by adding the missing elements that are not in the infrastructure. One
way to describe these missing elements are f -representations.
In the number field case, another embedding and representation has been first
described by H. W. Lenstra in [15]; a more general and more modern approach can
be found in [27].
2If one drops this assumption, one cannot show that one has ‘enough’ reduced ideals, which
makes computation of baby and giant steps problematic. One has to use another definition of
reduced ideals, and define an equivalence relation on the set of all reduced ideals to make d
injective.
3Let O 1
a
,O 1
b
∈ Red(K) with ν1(a) = ν1(b) + kR, k ∈ Z. As O 1a = O
1
aε−k
and ν1(aε−k) =
ν1(b), we assume k = 0 without loss of generality. Now
b
a
∈ O 1
a
and ν1(
b
a
) = 0. If ν2(
b
a
) ≥ 0,
then we must have b
a
∈ F∗q as O
1
a
is reduced, whence O 1
a
= O 1
b
. If ν2(
b
a
) < 0, we have ν2(
a
b
) > 0,
ν1(
a
b
) = 0 and a
b
∈ O 1
b
, contradicting that a
b
∈ F∗q as O
1
b
is reduced.
4From now on, we will interpret these relative distances as real numbers instead of elements of
R/RZ, by identifying them with their smallest non-negative representative, i.e. we identify a+RZ
with a if 0 ≤ a < R.
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Let (X, d) be a cyclic infrastructure of circumference R.
Definition 3.1. An f -representation is a pair (x, f), where x ∈ X and f ∈ [0, R[
such that [d(x), d(x) + f ] ∩ d(X) = {d(x)}. Denote the set of f -representations by
Repf (X, d).
If (X, d) is discrete, define the subset
Repfdiscrete(X, d) := {(x, f) ∈ Repf (X, d) | f ∈ Z}.
Note that infrastructures obtained from function fields, as described in Section 2,
are discrete. One can also obtain infrastructures from number fields of unit rank one
by a very similar method (for details, see [6]), but these are never discrete (see
Section 7).
Definition 3.2. Define the (absolute) distance of a pair (x, f) ∈ X × R by
d(x, f) := d(x) + f ∈ R/RZ.
Then we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The map
d|Repf (X,d) : Repf (X, d)→ R/RZ, (x, f) 7→ d(x, f) = d(x) + f
gives a bijection between the set of f -representations and R/RZ. If (X, d) is discrete,
this restricts to a bijection
d|Repfdiscrete(X,d) : Rep
f
discrete(X, d)→ Z/RZ.
Remark 1. If (x, f) ∈ X × R is arbitrary, there exists a unique f -representation
(x′, f ′) such that d(x, f) = d(x′, f ′). More precisely, it is the f -representation (x′, f ′)
with d(x, f) = d(x′, f ′) such that f ′ ≥ 0 is minimal.
If |f | is small, (x′, f ′) can be computed efficiently using baby steps by starting
with (x, f) and minimizing f :
(1) While f is negative, replace (x, f) by (bs−1(x), f + ∆), where ∆ := d(x) −
d(bs−1(x)) ∈ [0, R[.
(2) Compute x′′ := bs(x) and ∆′ := d(x′′)− d(x) ∈ [0, R[.
(3) If ∆′ > f , then (x, f) is an f -representation and we are done.
(4) Otherwise, replace (x, f) by (x′′, f −∆′) and continue with step (2).
One quickly sees that all operations do not modify the distance d(x, f). In case
(X, d) is discrete, one needs at most |f | (inverse) baby step computations.
Using this remark, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If (x, f) and (x′, f ′) are f -representations, consider the tuple
(gs(x, x′), f + f ′ − (d(gs(x, x′))− d(x) − d(x′))).
By the previous remark, it corresponds to a unique f -representation (x′′, f ′′). If we
define
(x, f) ◦ (x′, f ′) := (x′′, f ′′),
we get that (Repf (X, d), ◦) is a group and
d|Repf (X,d) : (Repf (X, d), ◦)→ (R/RZ,+)
is a group isomorphism. If (X, d) is discrete, we get that (Repfdiscrete(X, d), ◦) is a
subgroup of Repf (X, d) and that
d|Repfdiscrete(X,d) : (Rep
f
discrete(X, d), ◦)→ (Z/RZ,+)
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is a group isomorphism. The relationships between these structures are described in
the following diagram:
X × R %
d

Repf (X, d)
d|
Repf (X,d)
∼=

% Repfdiscrete(X, d)
d|
Rep
f
discrete
(X,d)
∼=

R/RZ R/RZ % Z/RZ
Therefore, if we are able to effectively compute bs, bs−1 and gs and relative
distances for an infrastructure (X, d), we can efficiently compute in a group isomor-
phic to R/RZ or Z/RZ, even if R is unknown and without the need to evaluate the
function d for general elements of X . More precisely:
Corollary 1. Let (X, d) be an infrastructure such that bs, bs−1 and gs are efficiently
computable, together with the relative distances. Let dmin := min{d(bs(x)) − d(x) |
x ∈ X} and dmax := max{d(bs(x)) − d(x) | x ∈ X}. Then one group operation in
Repf (X, d) can be computed using one gs computation and at most
⌈
2dmax
dmin
⌉
compu-
tations of bs or at most
⌈
dmax
dmin
⌉
computations of bs−1.
Proof. Given (x, f), (x′, f ′) ∈ Repf (X, f), one first computes (x′′, f ′′) by x′′ :=
gs(x, x′) and f ′′ := f+f ′+(d(x)+d(x′)−d(x′′)); then d(x′′, f ′′) = d(x, f)+d(x′, f ′).
As, by definition of the giant step function, −dmax < d(x) + d(x′)− d(x′′) ≤ 0, we
have −dmax < f ′′ < 2dmax. When replacing (x′′, f ′′) by (bs(x′′), f ′′ − (d(bs(x′′)) −
d(x′′))) resp. (bs−1(x′′), f ′′ + (d(x′′) − d(bs−1(x′′)))), we have that f ′′ decreases
resp. increases at least by dmin. Hence, we can do at most
⌈
2dmax
dmin
⌉
baby steps resp.⌈
dmax
dmin
⌉
inverse baby steps before f ′′ gets negative resp. positive.
If (X, d) is a discrete infrastructure, dmin ≥ 1. If (X, d) is obtained from a
function field as described at the end of Section 2, it is an easy application of the
Riemann-Roch Theorem [34, p. 28, Theorem I.5.15] to see that dmax ≤
⌈
g+deg p2
deg p1
⌉
.
This also shows that one should order p1 and p2 such that deg p1 ≥ deg p2. Note
that this result is also valid if deg pi > 1 for both i.
Remark 2. In case we want to compute in Repf (X, d) (which is, for example,
necessary if (X, d) is not discrete), we need to work with (arbitrary) real numbers.
As this is not possible on computers, one needs to approximate them using floating
point numbers. More details on this can be found in [9] and [13]; there, such
representations are called CRIAD-representations resp. (f, p)-representations.
Finally, we want to note that in the case of real hyperelliptic function fields, a
similar representation has been used by S. Paulus and H.-G. Ru¨ck in [19] to describe
the arithmetic in the Jacobian. This, together with the discussion in [11], shows
that in this case, our group Z/RZ is in fact the subgroup of the Jacobian which
is generated by the divisor class of p1 − p2. This is also true for non-hyperelliptic
function fields under the assumption that deg p1 = deg p2 = 1.
4. Pohlig-Hellman in groups
Before explaining how to do Pohlig-Hellman in discrete infrastructures in Sec-
tion 5, we want to recall the Pohlig-Hellman method for finite cyclic groups.
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Assume that we have a finite cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of orderm and an element h ∈
G. We can consider the discrete logarithm problem, which states that one wants to
find some n ∈ N with
gn = h.
Note that n is unique modulo m. Assume that the prime factorization
m =
t∏
i=1
peii
with distinct primes p1, . . . , pt and positive integers e1, . . . , et ∈ N>0 is known. To
compute n, note that by the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
G ∼= Z/mZ ∼= Z/pe11 Z× · · · × Z/pett Z.
Therefore, we can compute n modulo peii for every i and deploy the Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem to recover n modulo m.
To compute nmod peii , we successively compute nmod p
ℓ
i , ℓ = 1, . . . , ei, by con-
sidering the discrete logarithm problem(
gm/p
ℓ
i
)nmod pℓi
= hm/p
ℓ
i ,
where nmod pℓi is sought. As we assume that we already know nmod p
ℓ−1
i , we only
have to solve the discrete logarithm problem
(1)
(
gm/pi
)n′
= hm/p
ℓ
ig−m/p
ℓ
i · (nmod p
ℓ−1
i
),
where n′ ∈ {0, . . . , pi − 1}, to obtain
nmod pℓi = (nmod p
ℓ−1
i ) + n
′pℓ−1i .
Assuming that we are using a method for solving discrete logarithms for elements
of prime order p which needs O(√p) group operations (according to [29], this is
optimal if one assumes that G behaves like a generic group), the running time of
Pohlig-Hellman is
O
( t∑
i=1
eimax{√pi, logm}
)
= O(t max
i=1,...,t
eimax{√pi, logm}
)
group operations.
5. Pohlig-Hellman in discrete infrastructures
Assume that (X, d) is a discrete infrastructure of circumference R ∈ Z. We have
seen that this gives rise to a finite set Repfdiscrete(X, d) of R elements, which can be
equipped with the structure of a cyclic group. In the following, we will write this
group additively, i.e. the group operation will be + and instead of exponentiation,
we will use scalar multiplication.
We further assume that R together with an element (x, f) ∈ Repfdiscrete(X, d) is
known where d(x, f) = d(x)+ f is known and small.5 Using baby steps and inverse
baby steps, we can compute an f -representation (x′, f ′) with d(x′, f ′) = 1 from this
(compare Remark 1). Then we have Repfdiscrete(X, d) = 〈(x′, f ′)〉.
In the group (Repfdiscrete(X, d),+) we can consider the discrete logarithm problem
n · (x′, f ′) = (x′′, f ′′),
5We call an element r ∈ R/RZ small if we can write r = rˆ +RZ with rˆ small.
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where (x′′, f ′′) ∈ Repfdiscrete(X, d) and n ∈ Z. In particular, as d(x′, f ′) = 1, we
have that d(x′′, f ′′) = n + RZ, whence solving the discrete logarithm problem for
an element in X is equivalent to computing a distance of an element in X .
As we can effectively compute the group operation in Repfdiscrete(X, d), we can
employ any algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in groups to find n and,
in particular, as we know the group order, we can employ the Pohlig-Hellman algo-
rithm.
Assume that the prime factorization
R =
t∏
i=1
peii
with distinct primes p1, . . . , pt and positive integers e1, . . . , et ∈ N>0 is known. We
have seen in Section 4 that in order to find n, we need to solve the discrete logarithm
problems
(2) n′ ·
(
R
pi
· (x′, f ′)
)
=
R
pℓi
· (x′′, f ′′)− (nmod pℓ−1i ) ·
(
R
pℓi
· (x′, f ′)
)
for n′ for i = 1, . . . , t and ℓ = 1, . . . , ei; this is Equation (1) transcribed to our
setting. Note that we know that the order of R
pℓ
i
· (x′, f ′) divides pℓi , whence we have
that − R
pℓ
i
· (x′, f ′) = (pℓi − 1) · Rpℓ
i
· (x′, f ′). In particular, there is no need to compute
inverses, if one rewrites Equation (2) as
n′ ·
(
R
pi
· (x′, f ′)
)
=
R
pℓi
· (x′′, f ′′) + (nmod pℓ−1i ) · (pℓi − 1) ·
(
R
pℓi
· (x′, f ′)
)
.
As in Section 4, we get that the running time of Pohlig-Hellman is
O
( t∑
i=1
eimax{√pi, logR}
)
= O(t max
i=1,...,t
eimax{√pi, logR}
)
group operations in Repfdiscrete(X, d).
Remarks 1.
(a) The Pohlig-Hellman method can be parallelized: for computing nmod peii , there
is no knowledge required of nmod p
ej
j for any j 6= i. This reduces the running
time to
O( max
i=1,...,t
eimax{√pi, logR}
)
group operations in Repfdiscrete(X, d) when using t processors.
(b) Note that it suffices to know an integer multiple R′ of the circumference R and
the factorization
R′ =
t′∏
i=1
peˆii
with t′ ≥ t. In this case, we have eˆi ≥ ei for each i ≤ t. If one applies Pohlig-
Hellman with R′ instead of R, i.e. by replacing the ei’s by the eˆi’s, the algorithm
will return the same value of n, as for ℓ > ei, the solution of Equation (2) will
be n′ = 0. The only disadvantage is that the running time will increase to
O(t′ max
i=1,...,t
eˆimax{√pi, logR}
)
group operations.
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An alternative is to first try to find the ei’s from the eˆi’s. For that, one
computes R
′
pi
· (x′, f ′) for each i; if this equals the identity in Repfdiscrete(X, d),
we have eˆi > ei. In that case, we can decrease eˆi by one, i.e. replace R
′ by R
′
pi
,
and try again.
(c) One can also deploy the Pohlig-Hellman method if d(x′, f ′) 6= 1. In case no n′
is found for one instance of Equation (2), we have (x′′, f ′′) 6∈ 〈(x′, f ′)〉.
If we have d(x′, f ′) 6= 1, it is enough to know an integer multiple of Rgcd(ℓ,R) ,
where ℓ ∈ Z is any integer with ℓ + RZ = d(x′, f ′), as Rgcd(ℓ,R) is the order of
(x′, f ′) in Repfdiscrete(X, d).
6. Testing for smooth circumference
With respect to the result from last section, it is desirable to check whether a
given discrete cyclic infrastructure (X, d) with circumference R satisfies that R is
B-smooth, i.e. that all prime divisors of R are ≤ B, for some integer B ∈ N. In
practice, in particular when using a discrete cyclic infrastructure for cryptographic
reasons, it can happen that R is not known. In this section, we present an algorithm
which still allows to check whether R is B-smooth. (Also see the discussion following
Question 1 in Section 8, where the smoothness of the regulator of a randomly chosen
function field is discussed.)
For this, we make the following requirements:
(1) we know some (x, f) ∈ Repfdiscrete(X, d) with d(x, f) = 1;
(2) we know an upper bound R′ for R;
(3) for every (x′, f ′) ∈ Repfdiscrete(X, d), we can efficiently check whether d(x′, f ′) =
0, i.e. whether (x′, f ′) is the identity in Repfdiscrete(X, d).
For discrete cyclic infrastructures obtained from unit rank one function fields as
described in Section 2, these requirements are always satisfied. Assume that K is
such a function field with full field of constants Fq and genus g. Then we have that:
(1) either (x, f) = (O, 1) or (x, f) = (bs(O), 0) is an f -representation with d(x, f) =
1;
(2) an explicit upper bound for R can be given using Hasse-Weil, as shown below;
and
(3) d(x′, f ′) = 0 if, and only if, x′ = O and f ′ = 0.
Both (1) and (3) follow from the fact that d(O) = 0 and from the definition of f -
representations. For (2), let d = gcd(deg p1, deg p2) and D :=
deg p2
d p1 − deg p1d p2 ∈
Div(K). Then, for n =
∣∣Pic0Fq(K)∣∣, the divisor nD is principal. Now, by Hasse-
Weil, n ≤ (1 +√q)2g [16, p. 287, Corollary 6.3 and Remark 6.4]. As nD 6= 0 must
be the divisor of a non-constant unit ε of O, we obtain
R ≤ |ν1(ε)| ≤ deg p2
d
(1 +
√
q)2g.
Note that this bound is rather crude; for example, for real quadratic function fields
of Richaud-Degert type, the regulator is very small.
Our method is formulated in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. Let p1, . . . , pt be all primes ≤ B, and define
m :=
t∏
i=1
p
⌊
logR′
log pi
⌋
i ,
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where R′ satisfies R′ ≥ R. Then R is B-smooth if, and only if, d(m · (x, f)) = 0.
Proof. Firstly, note that R is B-smooth if, and only if, R | m, as R ≤ R′. Secondly,
the cyclic group Repfdiscrete(X, d) is generated by (x, f) and has order R, whence
m · (x, f) is the identity (i.e. has distance 0) if, and only if, m is an integer multiple
of R.
Note that our method is very similar to the computations done in J. Pollard’s
(p − 1)-method [17, p. 93, Algorithm 3.14] or in H. W. Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve
Method for Factorization [14].
Remark 3. To evaluate m · (x, f), one can proceed iteratively, as it is usually done
in Pollard’s (p− 1)-method and in Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Method:
Define (x0, f0) := (x, f) and
(xi, fi) := p
⌊
logR′
log pi
⌋
i (xi−1, fi−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Then m · (x, f) = (xt, ft). To compute (xi, fi) from (xi−1, fi−1), one does
⌊
logR′
log pi
⌋
consecutive multiplications of (xi−1, fi−1) by pi.
Therefore, to compute m · (x, f) using this method, one needs
O
(
t
⌊
logR′
log pi
⌋
log pi
)
= O(t logR′)
group operations in Repf (X, d), assuming a square-and-multiply technique is used
for multiplication by pi.
In the case of infrastructures obtained from function fields, we get:
Corollary 2. If (X, d) is a discrete infrastructure of circumference R obtained from
a function field (as in Section 2) of genus g with full field of constants Fq, then one
needs at most O(tg log q) giant step and O(tg2 log q) baby step computations to check
whether R is pt-smooth, where pt is the t-th prime number.
7. Pohlig-Hellman and infrastructures based on number fields
In the case that K is a number field of unit rank one, i.e. with two places
at infinity, one can construct a cyclic infrastructure basically the same way as for
function fields with two places at infinity. This is, for example, described in [6]. In
the number field case, O is the integral closure of Z in K, and F∗q is replaced by
the roots of unity in K. The places at infinity correspond to the (non-conjugate)
embeddings K → C; if the two embeddings are σ1 and σ2, the condition that
deg σi = 1 for one i corresponds to σi(K) ⊆ R. Moreover, the valuations νi are
defined by νi(x) := − log |σi(x)|, x ∈ K∗. Let (X, d) be the resulting infrastructure.
Note that if α ∈ K∗, then |σi(α)| is algebraic over Q and, hence, νi(α) is tran-
scendental over Q by Lindemann’s Theorem if νi(α) 6= 0. Therefore, in particular,
neither R nor any element of d(X), except 0, is a rational number, whence (X, d)
is far from being discrete.
Let x ∈ O \ {0}. We want to investigate when ν1(x)R ∈ Q happens. If R = ν1(ε)
for ε ∈ O∗, we have that ν1(x)R = pq with p, q ∈ Z \ {0} implies |σ1(xq/εp)| = 1. By
[3, p. 285, (8)], we must have |σ2(xq/εp)| = 1. Now, if O 1x is reduced, this implies
that x
q
εp is a root of unity, i.e. is equal to ±1, i.e. we have that xq = ±εp. But then,
we have
NK/Q(x)
q = NK/Q(x
q) = NK/Q(±εp) = ±1,
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whence our assumption x ∈ O implies that x ∈ O∗. This is the main ingredient of
the following result:
Proposition 4. If a ∈ Red(K), then (a, 0) has finite order in Repf (X, d) if, and
only if, a = O.
Proof. If a = O, then (a, 0) is the identity of Repf (X, d). For the other direction,
write a = O 1x with x ∈ O. As d : Repf (X, d) → R/RZ, (b, f) 7→ d(b) + f =
−ν1(x)+f+RZ is an isomorphism, (a, 0) having finite order means that −ν1(x)R ∈ Q.
By the discussion before the lemma, this implies x ∈ O∗, whence a = O 1x = O.
As the Pohlig-Hellman method (or any other of the standard discrete logarithm
problem solvers) requires an element of finite order (of which an integer multiple has
to be known in the case of the Pohlig-Hellman method), we cannot directly apply
the Pohlig-Hellman method to (a, 0) ∈ Repf (X, d), but have to find a positive real
number f ∈ R and an f -representation (b, f ′) ∈ Repf (X, d) with d(a)+f = d(b)+f ′
such that (b, f ′) has finite order in Repf (X, d).
This of course opens the question how to find such an f , if one does not already
know d(a) and R. Obviously, if one knows d(a) in advance, there is no need to apply
the Pohlig-Hellman method to compute d(a). Hence, one has to find f without this
information, or one has to adjust the Pohlig-Hellman method to circumvent this
problem.
Finally, as Lenstra used a different distance function in the case that K is a
real quadratic number field [15], we want to investigate whether with his distance
function, a Pohlig-Hellman variant is possible. Let K be a real quadratic number
field and let σ be the unique non-trivial automorphism of K. Assume that O 1x ∈
Red(K).
Instead of using the distance −ν1(x)+RZ, Lenstra uses 12 (ν2(x)−ν1(x))+RZ =
1
2 log
∣∣∣σ1(x)σ2(x)
∣∣∣+RZ. Then, ν2(x)−ν1(x)2R = p2q ∈ Q is equivalent to σ1(xq)σ1(σ(x)q) = σ1(x
q)
σ2(xq)
=
±σ1(ε−p) for p, q ∈ Z, q 6= 0. Now σ(xq) = ±xqε−p means that if p is a finite
place of K, then qνp(x) = qνσ(p)(x). But this means that
σ(x)
x ∈ O∗, which implies
ε−p/q ∈ O∗. Since O∗ = 〈−1, ε〉, it follows that pq ∈ Z. Without loss of generality,
assume q = 1, i.e. we have ν2(x)−ν1(x)2R =
p
2 . Hence,
ν2(x)−ν1(x)
2 + RZ can attain at
most the values 0 + RZ and R2 + RZ in R/RZ, whence by [15, p. 15, Section 10]
there are at most two f -representations (O 1x , 0) ∈ Repf (X, d) of finite order, and
the possible orders are one or two.
By this argumentation, we have the same problems implementing Pohlig-Hellman
using this distance function as in the case of the other distance function.
8. Conclusion
There exist several cryptosystems employing discrete cyclic infrastructures; for
examples of such, see [4, 23, 26, 13, 12, 10]. They are all based on the hardness of
computing distances: if (X, d) is a cyclic infrastructure, these systems require that
it is hard to compute d(x) for a general x ∈ X . Note that this is equivalent to
computing d(x, 0) for (x, 0) ∈ Repf (X, d).
Now assume that (X, d) is discrete with circumference R, and that an integer
multiple R′ of R is known. Moreover, assume that R′ is smooth, i.e. that R′
factors with relatively small prime factors. If baby, inverse baby and giant steps
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and relative distances can be computed efficiently, we can use the Pohlig-Hellman
method described in Section 5 to compute d(x, 0) relatively fast.
Hence, in order for cryptosystems which are based on the hardness of computing
absolute distances in discrete cyclic infrastructures to be safe, one has to use discrete
infrastructures such that
(a) either it is very hard to compute a multiple R′ of R which can be factorized,
(b) or R is not smooth, i.e. has at least one very large prime factor.
In (a), it may even be enough that only a part of R′ can be factorized, if this
part is still a multiple of R: assume that R′ factors as R1R2, where R1 is smooth,
i.e. has small prime factors, but R2 has only very large prime factors. Then it still
might be that R2 is not needed for computing d(x): one computes R1 · (O, 1), and
if it equals (O, 0), one can take R1 instead of R. If one knows that R is smooth, R
will be a divisor of R1 and we will have R1 · (O, 1) = (O, 0).
To avoid the possibility that the Pohlig-Hellman method can be used, one has
to use function fields whose regulator is not B-smooth for a “large enough” B. A
na¨ıve way to find such function fields is to randomly pick a function field (with
two places at infinity, one of them of degree one) and to apply the algorithm from
Section 6 to check whether the regulator is B-smooth; this procedure is repeated
until a sufficient curve is found.
This leads to several important questions:
(1) How smooth is the regulator of an average function field with two places at
infinity, one of them of degree one?
In [26, Section 6.1], R. Scheidler, A. Stein and H. C. Williams apply the heuristic
arguments of H. Cohen and H. W. Lenstra to real hyperelliptic function fields. They
reason that the odd part of the ideal class group Pic(O) of O in the real hyperelliptic
function field case is small with high probability. As R · |Pic(O)| = ∣∣Pic0Fq(K)∣∣, and∣∣Pic0Fq(K)
∣∣ ∈ [(√q−1)2g, (√q+1)2g], this shows thatR is large with high probability.
More importantly, the smoothness of R is more or less equivalent to the smoothness
of
∣∣Pic0Fq(K)∣∣ under the assumption of these heuristics.
An equivalent to the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics for quadratic number fields is the
heuristics by E. Friedman and L. C. Washington [8] for quadratic function fields.
The main difference to the number field case is that for function fields, these have
been proven (in a slightly modified version) by J. D. Achter [1] in certain cases. In
our case, an older result by J. D. Achter and J. Holden [2] already gives sufficient
information. Let ℓ be a prime which is coprime to q. Then, by [2, Lemma 3.3],
the proportion of real hyperelliptic function fields K of genus g over Fq for which
ℓ ∤
∣∣Pic0Fq(K)∣∣ is 1− ℓℓ2−1 +O(1/ℓ3) if ℓ ≡ 1 (mod q) and 1− 1ℓ−1 +O(1/ℓ3) if ℓ 6≡ 1
(mod q). This is slightly less than the probability that a random natural number in
the interval [(
√
q−1)2g, (√q+1)2g] is not divisible by ℓ, which is approximately 1− 1ℓ .
Therefore, one expects that R is B-smooth with a slightly higher probability than
that a random natural number in the interval [(
√
q− 1)2g, (√q+1)2g] is B-smooth,
which is rather low for B ≪ qg.
A more straightforward approach to the problem of finding function fields whose
regulator is not B-smooth would be to ask the following question:
(2) Can one efficiently construct function fields with two places at infinity, one of
them of degree one, such that the regulator is known to have a very large prime
factor?
More generally, one can also ask the following question:
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(3) Given an arbitrary positive integer R, can one efficiently construct a function
field with two places at infinity, one of them of degree one, which has regula-
tor R, or R · ℓ with ℓ ∈ N small?
In the case of real elliptic function fields, this is basically equivalent to finding an
elliptic curve together with a rational point of order R, as it is explained in [31]: if
E is an elliptic curve over Fq with the point ∞ at infinity, and if P ∈ E(Fq) \ {∞},
one can transform the equation of E such that one obtains a function field with two
places at infinity, which correspond to the two points P and ∞ of E. Moreover,
the regulator of this new function field is exactly the order of P , and the reduced
principal ideals correspond to the multiples of P . For hyperelliptic function fields,
one has a similar correspondence; see [19].
Currently, elliptic or hyperelliptic curves (or, more precisely, their imaginary
function field counterparts K) with a specific number of points (i.e. elements in
Pic0Fq(K)) are usually constructed using complex multiplication, or by choosing
curves from very special families of curves (see, for example, [7]). It is currently not
known whether there are special attacks for these classes of curves.
A final question arises from the fact that there are also proposals for cyclic
infrastructure based cryptography for infrastructures obtained from number fields
(for examples, see [5, 23, 13, 12]). In the previous section, we have seen that the
Pohlig-Hellman method cannot be applied in the number field case in its current
state. Therefore, one can ask the following:
(4) Can a similar method be applied to cyclic infrastructures obtained from number
fields, or generally to non-discrete cyclic infrastructures?
So far, the author is not aware of any idea of whether this question can be answered
positively.
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